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Abstract 
This paper explores the pressures of standardisation and differentiation in 
employment relations in China. Using case studies from two companies that share the 
same ownership, industry, size, location and labour market, the paper will show that, 
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employment relations in different ways, there continues to be an opening at the 
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Employment Relations at the Workplace Level in China: 
Two Contrasting Cases  
YU ZHENG, Teaching Fellow, School of Management, Royal Holloway University of 
London 
CHRIS SMITH, Professor of Management, School of Management, Royal Holloway 
University of London 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in China have attracted considerable research 
attention during the past decade and many researchers are interested in understanding 
how MNCs manage employment relations in their Chinese subsidiaries (Bjorkman 
and Lu, 1997, 1999, 2001; Cooke, 2004; Gamble, 2002, 2006a, 2006b, forthcoming; 
Walsh and Zhu, 2007). Despite some attempts to develop eclectic frameworks to 
capture the competing pressure facing MNCs in China (and MNCs in general) and 
dynamics involved in managing subsidiary employment relations, a key debate 
remains: will MNCs eventually adopt more programmatic “low-cost” techniques (the 
“race-to-the-bottom” thesis) in China or will they continuously transfer established 
employment practices to China (the “progressive transfer” thesis)?  
 
Researchers following the “race-to-the-bottom” thesis see China as the host of a large 
number of manufacturing plants which relocated because of the economic rationale of 
reducing the costs of production. For these MNCs, operations are segmented, with 
“high-value added” activities reserved for home country subsidiaries and “low-value 
added” production moving to countries with low labour costs, most especially China. 
Further, it is suggested that the mobility of these MNCs has restrained the legislative 
and administrative power of the Chinese government to protect the workers and to 
encourage stable employment relations in the foreign invested companies (Cooke and 
Rubery, 2002). So, while evidence of more positive intervention by the Chinese state, 
such as an increase in employment tribunals in recent years and the new Employment 
Contract Law introduced in 2008 are seen by some as the government intervening to 
manage social disorder in response to considerable labour protests (Silver and Zheng, 
2009), the actual implementation and impact of the new labour law needs further 
investigation. Besides, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) and 
unions in individual foreign invested companies are seldom involved in collective 
bargaining and negotiation over employment terms (Clarke, 2005), apart from largely 
symbolic moves against companies like Wal-Mart (Blecher, 2010: 105-6)i. In general 
this non-intervention gave MNCs leeway to autonomously manage the local 
workforce.  
 
The “race-to-the-bottom thesis” suggests job design in these foreign invested 
manufacturing plants is simplified, with extensive fool-proofing requiring low or no 
skills from the workers. Employment relations are based on short and fixed-term 
labour contracts, pay is contingent to daily output, training basic to a limited range of 
task, and welfare limited or not offered to the majority of employees. The 
consequence is that employees show low morale, high turnover and absenteeism. 
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Spontaneous collective actions against the employers does take place, but in contained 
ways (Cooke, 2005; Lee, 2007). 
 
Contrary to the picture of an inevitably “despotic” work regime in Chinese factories, 
other researchers argue that China’s lack of established “local management model” 
facilitates MNCs to reproduce some established home country practices in their 
Chinese subsidiaries (Goodall and Warner, 1998). Based on longitudinal studies of 
European-Chinese joint ventures over a 10-year period, Bjorkman et al (2008) found 
that subsidiaries showed some resemblance to both the parent and local companies in 
terms of employment practices. They interpreted this observation as a sign of 
convergence to global standardisation. On the one hand, they argue that MNCs have 
gradually transferred their home practices to manage employment relations in their 
Chinese subsidiaries, though these practices were modified to fit into China’s labour 
market conditions and national institutions. On the other hand, they also suggest that 
local companies, especially large scale ones competing in the international market 
have adopted more sophisticated employment practices learned from their Western 
counterparts. The Chinese government is also found to be actively promoting long-
term and commitment-based employment relations through restructuring the SOEs, 
giving preferential industrial policies to the sun-rise sectors, introducing statutory 
employment regulations and setting up a supportive social security system (Cooke, 
2003; Kwong and Qui, 2003; Lee, 2007). These authors therefore foresee a trend of 
standardisation of employment practices convergent to practices adopted in more 
advanced economies, although some “Chinese characteristics” may remain (Zhu, et 
al., 2005).  
 
Such a mixed picture of employment relations is not surprising given the transitional 
nature of the Chinese economy and the scale and economic diversity of China. 
Moreover these empirical studies were conducted across different time periods, were 
based on companies with different sizes, ages, ownership and international 
experiences, and from various country-of-origins, as well as competing in different 
industrial sectors and product markets, and located in different regions within China. 
However, a key question is to what extent can companies choose their employment 
relations and to what extent do locality, country-of-origin or a host of other 
contingencies determine subsidiary level choices.  
 
To address this question, this paper will use two case studies of companies that share 
established contingencies of ownership, industry, size, age, production mode, product 
range, location and labour market. The cases are selected from Japanese firms as they 
provide a strong foundation for examining transfer, as it is generally recognised that 
the Japanese employment system is robust and distinctive, which would lead us to 
predict that the likelihood of shared practice between the two companies is high, and 
hence their reaction to the same environment might also be expected to be similar. In 
this way we can test country-of-origin thesis, that is, the tendency for employment 
relations to look like home practices in the overseas subsidiaries. We can also test the 
strength of local institutional context, and predict that two companies with common 
contingencies in the same environment would be expected to pursue common policies 
with regard to work and employment relations. Finally, by using the intensive 
comparative case methodology, based on structured observation, we are able to 
explore the workplace-level employment and work relations in some detail and with 
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considerable reliability, which surveys of Chinese HR and employment relations are 
not able to achieve. This permits us to test the strength of corporate or company level 
difference and hence the ‘relative autonomy’ (Edwards, 1990) of the subsidiary in 
terms of choosing employment and work organisation to suit particular needs. The 
question of workplace regulation having a ‘relative autonomy’ suggests that similar 
external situations can produce different internal work and employment outcomes, 
because of the distinctiveness and peculiarities of particular points of production and 
the way workers and managers work out or enact day-to-day relations. However, this 
does not imply an infinite variety of workplaces isolated from globalizing standards 
(carried by MNCs) or state direction (enforced by legal codes of government and the 
institutional setting). It is precisely the space for diversity and conformity that the 
paper aims to analyze through a comparative case study methodology. 
 
The paper is presented in five sections: we firstly briefly review employment practices 
in China.  We then move on to consider the rationales and limitations of studying 
employment relations at workplace level by using comparative case study methods. 
We then compare the two sample subsidiaries and analyses how employment relations 
were managed and how the forces shaping employment relations in each subsidiary 
operated. Finally, we conclude the paper by drawing out the lessons of the case 
studies and the implications they have for future research.  
 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN CHINA 
 
China has been in transition to the market for 30 years, yet employment relations are 
far from achieving a convergent form of “local best practice”. There used to be highly 
unified practices governing employment relations in the public sector and state owned 
enterprises (SOEs). The large-scale SOEs were the dominant employers and recruited 
more than 70% of the urban working population, offering life-long employment and 
extensive welfare including pension, housing, healthcare, childcare, and sometimes, 
employment of employees’ family. As part of market-oriented reform over the last 30 
years, the Chinese government launched a series of systematic reforms from the mid 
1990s to downsize SOEs, to break the “iron rice bowl” and to enhance operational 
efficiency. Management issues such as “clarification of individual responsibility,” 
“establishing merit-based appraisal” and “recruiting employees on a contract basis,” 
have become the drivers of SOE restructuring. For the employees, however, SOE 
downsizing meant losing job security, and for some of them, losing the job completely. 
Lee (1999) has suggested that labour surplus as the result of large-scale downsizing, 
together with the lack of legislative protection and weak collective representation 
created a form of “disorganised despotism” in employment relations in China.  
Compared to the SOEs, employment relations in the privatised companies in China 
show significant diversity. Unlike the SOEs which followed the government-led 
reform using the convergent Modern Enterprise System (CES) and Group Company 
System (GCS) models, privatised companies display significant differences in terms 
of production technologies, management approaches and workplace employment 
relations. A number of the most successful ones such as Hair, Lenovo and Huawei 
have developed systemic management practices to manage their workforce (Wu, 2000; 
Wen, 2006). On the other hand, a large majority of the individually privatised 
companies (such as family businesses) and the collectively privatised companies 
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(such as the Township and Village Enterprises) have remained organised in a 
paternalistic manner that relies on the exploitation of low-cost labour to survive 
amidst severe competition (Ding et al., 2001; Cooke, 2005) or extensive use of social 
capital to grow these firms (Chen, 2008). These employees often work for long hours 
under hazardous working environment, pay rates are very low and they are given 
limited training and very few benefits.  
Last but not least, foreign invested companies form the third group of “local 
companies”.  As discussed earlier, the existing literature reveals a rather mixed picture 
of management practices used by foreign invested companies in China. Evidence of 
this mixed picture is expressed through a number of themes on the relative influence 
of home and local practices on management action. The majority of foreign invested 
companies are clustered in the coastal areas and some special economic zones. These 
companies, joint ventures or wholly owned, employ “hybrid” forms of employment 
practices differing from both the parent management practices and management 
practices employed by the local companies (Child, 1994; Cooke, 2004; Gamble, 2003, 
2006a;Warner, 1993, 1997; 2005; Zhang and Edwards, 2007). Cultural and 
institutional differences between home countries and China (Ip, 1999; Warner, 1998;); 
local labour market conditions (Smith and Pun, 2006); industrial sector characteristics 
(Cooke, 2004; Zhang, 2008) and subsidiaries mode of production (Morris et al., 2009); 
as well as whether management control is executed by parent company personnel 
(Goodall and Warner, 1998) or local managers (Taylor, 1999; 2001) are found 
important in shaping the way employee relations are managed in these foreign 
invested companies.   
In summary, employment practices have become more diverse in China’s transition. 
Some features of the old danwei (work unit) still have their influence in certain 
sectors, especially those with national security considerations. In family and small 
businesses, employment issues remain to be decided by the business owners and are 
therefore typically paternalistic (Chen, 2004). Foreign invested companies have the 
capacity to introduce parent employment practices to their Chinese subsidiaries; 
however, the company’s’ autonomy to decide employment relations is questioned by 
some researchers. For example, industrial sectors are found to have largely 
constrained company’s choice of employment practices. Zhang (2008) studied 
Chinese automobile manufacturers and found that employment relations turned out to 
be similar to each other, with work design based on “lean production”, a growing 
wage discrepancy between workers and managers, and increasing use of contingent 
labour all present. His findings also suggested that the age of the company was critical 
in determining the composition of workforce and whether companies maintained 
long-term employment relations with some employee groups (largely those inhered 
from the SOEs) or used contracted workers – hence implying a development logic 
shaping aspects of employee relations.  
Local government regulations are often cited to be a force of “standardization” as well. 
Lee (2007) argues that the Chinese government intends to regulate employment 
relations through formal legislation. Promulgation of the Employment Contract Law 
in 2008 can thus be interpreted as the government’s endeavour to create some 
common standards to employment practices. Contrary to these arguments for 
“standardisation”, our empirical research shows that companies enjoy considerable 
freedom and manage employment relations in contrasting ways, even though we 
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controlled the contingent factors. Furthermore, since the companies’ existing 
employment practices are not ‘against the law’, implementing new labour law in 
China does not necessarily mean that the companies will have to make adjustment or 
adaptations. These findings will be reported in more detail in the following sections.  
STUDYING EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS THROUGH COMPARATIVE 
CASE STUDIES  
 
This paper is based on case studies of two Japanese synthetic fibre manufacturing 
plants (what we are calling COMMUNITY Co. and FLEXIBILITY Co) in a Chinese 
industrial new town-Nantong, outside of Shanghai. The methodological rational of 
selecting the two companies is to develop prototype case studies that help address the 
“progressive transfer” or “race-to-the-bottom” debate, and hence explore the forces of 
multinational capital in shaping the direction of Chinese employment and work 
relations. Japanese multinationals are universally recognised as having distinctive 
production and personnel management, which is considered an important source of 
competitive advantage, and hence likely to be transferred rather than abandoned 
through internationalisation of the Japanese firms (see Elger and Smith, 2005 for a 
review). In view of the structural differences between China and Japan, some studies 
predict progressive transfer from the Japanese parent plants and systemic learning of 
the Chinese subsidiaries (Campbell, 1994; Hong et al., 2006; Ma, 1998). These 
authors suggest that not only do the Japanese companies have reasons for transferring 
parent company employment practices to extend their competitive advantages, but 
they are also capable of doing so because of the availabilities of disciplined workers 
in China and less cultural distance between the two countries (Abo, 1994; Campbell, 
1994; Campbell and Burton, 1994; Taylor et al., 1996).  
 
Critiques of the “progressive transfer” arguments arise from both the production 
strategy analysis and the perspective from the national business system (NBS) 
literature, which suggests continued national diversity between societies (Zhu and 
Warner, 2000). After examining the investment strategy of Japanese foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to China, some scholars argue that shifting routinised and low-skill 
production from Japan to China indicates simplification or “Taylorist” job design and 
employment relations, and therefore transfer of parent employment relation practices 
is only limited (Gamble et al., 2004; Morris et al., 2009; Taylor 1999, 2001). Also, 
scholars following the NBS approach stress that the socialisation and network-based 
control mechanism is embedded in the Japanese society and transfer of this to another 
space is extremely difficult (Legewie, 2002: 906). These characteristics of Japanese 
multinational in China make them an eligible context for us to revisit the debate 
regarding how employment relations are managed at workplace level. As mentioned 
above, all writers agree that there is a distinctive Japanese employment system, and 
hence there is something robust to examine in the context of a rapidly changing 
China, and hence this should allow for a careful dissection of the relative influence of 
internal and external forces on employment relations within one category of foreign-
invested firms in China. 
 
The fieldwork was conducted through intensive interviews and on-site observations at 
the selected companies. Bearing in mind that adopting a qualitative approach will 
mean some loss of external validity compared with more numerical approaches, this 
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study takes a number of measures to enhance the external validity of the evidence. 
The first step is to select the sample companies to make sure that their parent 
companies are similar in terms of size, age, international experiences, industry, and 
product scope. The second step is to select subsidiaries so that they share similar 
ownership structure (both wholly owned by the Japanese parent company), age (both 
set up mid of the 1990s), size (both are large scale companies employed more than 
1500 employees), location (both locate in Nantong special economic zone), 
production technology (semi-automated machinery). The third step aims to achieve 
triangulation in information collected. This study uses different sources of 
information: descriptive analysis of the company documents and scanning of other 
accessible written records (such as company data release in Toyo Keizai Data Bank); 
on-site observation of the workplace and attending some of the social activities 
arranged by the companies; interviews with expatriates, local managers, local 
employees, where access was permitted (see Appendix 1 for the demographical 
information about the participant of this study). Finally, spending extensive time at 
the sample organisations also improves the researcher’s understanding of the 
interpretations of concept and meanings that are used within the organisational 
contexts of the sample companies. One of the authors stayed in each of the sample site 
for 4 weeks, living in the employee dormitory, following the daily routines and 
talking to both managers and workers. These methods allow us to gain important in-
sight of employment relations at workplace level.  
 
CONSTRUCTING EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS AT WORKPLACE LEVEL 
 
Nantong: An Industrial New Town In Yang-Zi River Delta 
The two companies reported in this paper are located in Nantong Special Economic 
Zone, an industrial new town to the north of China’s economic centre Shanghai. This 
location is a new manufacturing base transformed from a traditional agricultural area 
as a result of government-led industrialisation. Structural transition has created a large 
surplus of young unskilled rural labour. The average wage in the Nantong area was 
about 30 to 40 per cent lower than nearby areas to the south of the Yang-zi River Delta 
(though this difference has decreased in recent years). The government is keen to 
attract foreign investors by offering customs exemption for production machinery, tax 
reductions, and local income tax rebates. Land and property prices were much lower 
in Nantong compared to prefectures to the south of Shanghai. Nantong developed a 
textile industry cluster, especially synthetic fibre plants, spinning mills, weaving and 
dying yarn and garment factories.  
This locality has many implications for employment relations in the two cases -  
COMMUNITY Co. and FLEXIBILITY Co. Firstly, the companies faced a relatively 
homogenous labour market — unskilled workers who had previously been employed 
in agriculture in the neighbouring area. Although the turnover among migrants was 
high, industrialisation of the area forced large number of job-seekers to move into the 
area each year. This meant that the companies did not need to put much effort into 
finding unskilled replacements. Secondly, given Nantong’s lower salary levels and 
proximity to more developed areas, experienced employees often chose to migrate to 
areas such as Shanghai and Suzhou in search of better-paid work. To the Japanese 
subsidiaries, a critical issue therefore was how to retain the internally trained workers. 
Finally, the employees working in different companies formed the majority of the 
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local population. Since most employees lived in company-tied accommodation, news 
of new employment opportunities, working conditions and pay rates could spread 
quickly among employees. For the subsidiaries, this added to the difficulty of 
controlling employee behaviour such as “hopping” between different jobs in the same 
area.  
 
RELOCATING TO CHINA IN SEARCH OF A LOW COST PRODUCTION 
BASE 
The output of synthetic fibre manufacturing in China has accelerated since the mid-
1990s. By the end of 2006, China contributed more than half of the total output of 
textile synthetic fibre worldwide. Compared to China, Japan seems to have lost 
competitive advantage in the labour-intensive textile industry. The synthetic fibre 
companies witnessed decline and closure of factories in Japan. Most fibre 
manufacturers have gradually restructured their product range and reinforced 
innovative capacities at the home country. The headquarters have generally 
centralized the R&D function and production of new materials, and standardized 
production has largely been moved overseas. Since standard synthetic fibre 
manufacturers rely on economies of scale in production, these companies lack 
incentives of upgrading production machinery.  
“From the factory’s perspective, we prefer producing standardised fabric, which is 
more cost-effective. But the trend in the textile industry is that people do not want 
standardised clothes. Believe me; no company in this industry will invest in full 
automation as long as there is a place, somewhere in the world, that provides the 
low-cost labour. People are much more flexible than machines, and cheaper as 
well.” (Division manager, COMMUNITY Co., Japanese, male, 40) 
Relocation of subsidiaries reflects the company’s global division of labour. Neither 
COMMUNITY Co. nor FLEXIBILITY Co. was the earliest overseas subsidiary. They 
were initially supplementary manufacturing bases of their sister plants in Indonesia 
and Thailand. As COMMUNITY Co. and FLEXIBILITY Co. showed more cost 
advantages, they have overtaken their sister plants to become the major production 
base in Asia. Production expansion increased the demand for labour and both 
companies had taken measures to secure workers to maintain production.  
Composition of the workforce 
COMMUNITY Co. and FLEXIBILITY Co. recruited a large number of unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers and showed strong preference for young workers, largely due to 
the laborious and repetitive nature of the job. Employment contracts were yearly 
based and generally renewable. Composition of workforce was slightly different 
between COMMUNITY Co. and FLEXIBILITY Co.  
Recruitment in COMMUNITY Co. was overwhelmingly focused on local young 
students and the majority of shop floor workers (70%) were recruited from local 
technical colleges ii . Migrant workers made up 20% of the workforce and the 
remaining 10% were university graduates, who were normally recruited as managerial 
trainees. They do not have specific selection criteria apart from gender and health 
requirements, which can be seen as the company’s attempt to restrain labour mobility 
and enforce social control over a relatively malleable workforce. The rationale for 
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COMMUNITY Co.’s preference for technical college students seems practical when 
facing the high levels of employee turnover in the local area. As the HR manager 
stated:  
“In principle, we want to recruit local people because they are less mobile compared 
to migrants. The local technical colleges recruit from the nearby regions. Also, 
graduates from technical colleges have already gained some practical skills and are 
better disciplined. These make (internal) trainings much easier.” (HR Manager, 
COMMUNITY Co., Chinese, male, 37) 
Many employees working in the factories had left their rural home because the land 
allocated was not enough to afford a living for the whole family. For these workers, 
moving back home did not seem to be an option. These workers believed they would 
be better off working in factories. COMMUNITY Co. didn’t seem to have 
experienced difficulty in sourcing new recruits, but a more critical issue was how to 
control mobility among these young graduates. 
FLEXIBILITY Co. didn’t build strong alliance with local schools for recruitment. 
While the company did say that they preferred local workers, the continuous 
expansion of production capacity necessitated the use of more migrant workers. By 
the time FLEXIBILITY Co. was visited in 2007, migrant workers formed 70% of the 
total workforce. FLEXIBILITY Co. experienced high labour turnover (the published 
figure was 34% but the actual turnover was between 50%-60% according to the 
workshop supervisors). And like COMMUNITY Co., control of labour mobility is 
critical to achieve the productivity targets. 
Job design and working hours 
Work in both factories was extremely laborious. Production machines ran 7/24 to 
ensure full production capacity. Machinery noise, high temperatures, the smell of 
dying agents, and ever-present fibre dust degraded the working conditions. In terms of 
working hours, COMMUNITY Co. divided their workers into four shifts to ensure 
continuously production: a normal shift (8:15-17:00), early shift (7:00-15:15), late 
shift (15:00-23:15) and night shift (23:15-07:15). Workers could choose to work on 2-, 
3- or 4-shift patterns but average working time was normally eight hours per day. A 
worker had a day off after five working days and overtime was normally voluntary.  
This pattern was unusual in the industry and the company explained their working 
time design in relation to the international standards they followed:  
“We may be the only factory that performs 8-hour working policy strictly in this 
industry. Actually, our workers are not happy with 8 hours because this means they 
earn less each day compared to those working 10 or 12 hours a day. You know, 
stress always leads to accidents. Being an ISO14000 qualified company, workplace 
safety is our top priority.” (HR Manager, COMMUNITY Co., Chinese, male, 37) 
FLEXIBILITY Co. split their operating hours into three shifts: early (6:00-14:30), 
afternoon (14:00-22:30) and night (22:00-6:30) shifts. Workers often work more than 
8 hours as compulsory overtime was quite common.  
“Yes, we require overtime. The Japanese managers often criticise this because 
workers didn’t get enough rest. But they don’t understand Chinese workers. They are 
young, energised and want to earn money. They wouldn’t mind working overtime. 
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Actually they want to work overtime as the pay is higher.” (HR Manager, 
FLEXIBILITY Co., Chinese, male, 40) 
The managers’ explanation is only partially accurate.  Another important reason for 
worker willing to take long-hours was the low level of basic pay compared to the 
living expenses, which will be discussed in the next section.  
Work pressure also came from the enforcement of rigorous output and quality control 
standards. As most of the machinery was semi-automated, the workers had to cope 
with the speed of machines. While the workers are normally given a break every 2 or 
3 hours, some could not leave their work stations. The factories adopted detailed 
measures to monitor the production process, product quality, and workplace safety. 
Workers always see their supervisors and managers walking around at the workshop. 
In particular, the implementation of 5S was considered to be essential to maintain 
workplace safety and product quality. In COMMUNITY Co., a formal “factory 
inspection tour” was organized once a month and all the managers would meet to 
check 5S implementation. Photographs were taken wherever something inconsistent 
with the 5S standard was detected. These photos were then presented at the monthly 
managerial meeting. The person in charge of the workshop was supposed to take 
responsibility for improvement. Photographs of before and after improvement 
measures taken were expected to be presented at the following monthly meeting. 
Productivity, quality and 5S maintenance were all directly linked to workers’ salary.  
Pay and benefits 
Both COMMUNITY Co. and FLEXIBILITY Co. employ a complicated pay-for-the-
job-grade system. The workers generally agreed that the pay rates in both factories 
was “slightly better” than factories in the nearby area. However, close comparison of 
pay and benefit themes showed contrasting employment approaches.  
COMMUNITY Co. offered more benefits than FLEXIBILITY Co.. The starter’s 
salary was RMB950.00 (GBP86.38) per month with another RMB450.00 (about 
GBP40.90) paid to the worker’s social insurance account (including pension, work 
accident, serious illness, lay-off, and housing fund). The company also offered all 
employees enterprise health care insurance and maternity insurance for female 
workers. New recruits were required to pay for their health check before joining 
COMMUNITY Co. This health check fee was refunded after the employee stayed in 
the company for 6 months. All workers were entitled to a raise of RMB50.00 each 
year, which was often interpreted as a “seniority pay”. COMMUNITY Co. offered 
free accommodation and utilities (including bedding, water and electricity) except for 
the use of air-conditioners. The company offered one free meal at the factory and gave 
1/3 discount for other meals at the factory canteens.  
In contrast, wage levels at FLEXIBILITY Co. were higher compared to 
COMMUNITY Co. the starting salary was RMB1400.00 (GBP127.27) per month and 
with overtime workers  could earn as much as RMB2000.00 (GBP181.82) per month. 
An annual raise was not specified but often linked to the performance of the company. 
Pay to the employees social insurance account was based on the minimum amount 
required by the local labour bureau. FLEXIBILITY Co. also offered dormitories and 
factory canteens but employees needed to pay for accommodation, utilities and food.  
  12
 
 
 
The differences between the two companies were reinforced following a major HR 
review in both companies. Labour turnover problem became salient from 2000 due to 
the increased demands for workers to support both companies’ production expansion 
and the rising competition for workers in the local area with more companies setting 
up factories there. COMMUNITY Co. conducted their HR review in 2004. A key 
change in the pay system meant that the annual bonus was amalgamated into monthly 
salary. While the manager explained pay review was aimed to solve worker 
dissatisfaction, the raise seems only to have been rather nominal:   
“The managers said that our wage has been raised, but not really. Before, our bonus 
was not calculated for social insurance contribution. It seems we get more on the pay 
slip, but more was deducted as well.” (Operator, COMMUNITY Co., Chinese, 
female, 26) 
A more feasible explanation for the change of pay policy was that COMMUNITY Co. 
intended to control mobility among workers and to build long-term employment 
relations. Due to the provisional reform in China, regional policies concerning 
employers’ contribution varied.  COMMUNITY Co. chose to pay a higher proportion 
of insurance contribution to the worker’s social insurance account than either required 
by the government or contributed by other companies. Employees were not able to 
claim for pension and housing fund unless they have continuously paid to these 
accounts for a certain number of years. Also, in practice, transferring employees’ 
social insurance accounts required coordination between employers. Through 
accumulating a larger social insurance account, it was thought this would discourage 
the more experienced workers from moving to jobs, and at the same time, prevent 
workers from quitting their job without prior notice - a major problem in China. At the 
same time, the reviewed pay theme linked the workers’ salary with their daily output, 
quality and workplace behaviour. This was considered to be advantageous to the 
senior workers. 
“The older ones benefit more under current policy. They are more experienced, work 
faster and know the managers. Plus, the assessment is top-down. Of course the group 
leaders will rate the experienced people higher.” (Operator, COMMUNITY Co., 
Chinese, male, 22) 
These measures seem to indicate COMMUNITY Co.’s intention to develop long-term 
employment relations with a sense of seniority among their employees. At the same 
time, COMMUNITY Co. postponed its annual reward until after March, which was 
aimed at trying to address the high rate of labour turnover that occurs after the 
Chinese New Year.  
FLEXIBILITY Co. reviewed their pay structure in 2005, which was part of the 
corporate HR reform. While the original purpose of this review was to make the 
subsidiary HR system more consistent with that of the parent company, serious 
disagreements arose concerning the leverage of seniority in the assessment criteria. 
The Japanese managers insisted on the importance of seniority in the pay structure, 
which would help reduce conflicts generated by wage differences.  
“We incorporated ‘merit’ in performance assessment …Our Chinese managers 
always say that they don’t want to be assessed based on seniority. But they won’t like 
the idea of promoting someone who is much younger than they are. The elder ones 
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would make a big fuss if someone younger were paid slightly more than them.” (HR 
Manager, FLEXIBILITY Co. Chinese headquarters, Japanese, 48, male) 
Local Chinese managers seemed to be very critical about “seniority” as it was deemed 
to be “the exact cause of inefficiency in the Chinese SOEs” and hence these managers 
tended to support a “merit/competence-oriented” pay system. Since the parent 
companies’ general policy was to centralise some strategic HR functions at the 
regional headquarters and decentralise employment issues to subsidiary level, and 
also since the Japanese managers at subsidiaries had not been able to develop 
measures to control the persistently high levels of labour turnover, the Chinese 
managers gained more autonomy to decide employment relations related issues, such 
as identifying possible job-hoppers, finding replacements, giving training and 
designing policies to deal with migrants. Employment was often based on fixed-term 
contracts and pay became contingent on the short-term performance of workers. The 
consequence of HR review in FLEXIBILITY Co. was a division between a core 
group and the majority of employees. The core group was formed by the senior 
managers, who were offered pay and benefits package inconsistent with the parent 
company employees. For the majority of the employees under short-term contract, 
their pay was based on their productivity. While FEXLIBITY Co. did not rule out the 
possibility of promotions and hence integrating more employees into the “core” group, 
moving up was extremely difficult given the qualifications required for these posts. 
The following section discusses in more details about training and skill development 
in both companies.  
Skill development and career advancement 
Contrasting employment policies were also reflected in the way workers were trained 
in the two companies. COMMUNITY Co. put substantial resources into language 
training and developing workers’ skills in-house. All employees were expected to be 
able to communicate in Japanese and Japanese proficiency was essential for moving 
up in the company. COMMUNITY Co. preferred to recruit technical college students 
with some knowledge in Japanese and having the entire workforce Japanese literate 
was said to be a long term goal of the company. To this end, the company arranged 
different levels of language courses for the employees to attend and attendance was 
recorded as work attendance. Though no official rules required employees to attend 
the Japanese language courses, not attending was generally considered as “rule 
breaking” which could lead to lower assessment results and hence affect worker’s pay. 
Self-study was also encouraged. A skill bonus was paid to workers who had passed 
the Japanese Language Proficiency Test (JLPT) and the amount differed according 
with the level iii  of test. Japanese proficiency was also associated with internal 
promotion. An employee could not be assigned any leader role if they did not have 
JLPT level 4 and for departmental manager, the minimum requirement was a JLPT 
level 2 certificate.  
Concerning the rationale of intensive in-house language training, the managers 
explained that an understanding of Japanese was essential to avoid misunderstanding 
in technical and quality terms. In fact, all technical and quality related terms displayed 
in COMMUNITY Co. were in Japanese. PCs were installed with Japanese systems as 
well. More importantly, language training also functions to build “internal” 
knowledge among the workers and was seen as a way of controlling the mobility of 
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labour. As mentioned earlier, COMMUNITY Co. tended to train workers internally 
and labour turnover had a negative impact on the effectiveness of training in terms of 
enhancing skills of the workforce and reducing production accidents. While the 
general principle of recruiting young students and providing technical training 
internally remained unchanged, COMMUNITY Co. has rearranged training 
programmes to encourage building internal knowledge and skills – and hence internal 
labour markets. Japanese language is thus named as an entry-level skill. The measure 
to retain technical and managerial training until a certain level of language proficiency 
was achieved can also be interpreted as the management’s attempt to control mobility 
by putting emphasis of firm-specific skills and knowledge – in this case Japanese - 
which is useful in Japanese companies, but not other foreign-owned firms in China. 
In contrast, FLEXIBILITY Co. put limited effort into developing employees’ 
language skills internally. Rather, they encouraged employees to take professional 
language trainings by offering tuition refunds to the employees who passed Japanese 
or English language proficiency tests. In terms of technical skills, on-the-job training 
was cited as the most important way employees could gain and develop work 
knowledge. However, the scope and depth of job development an employee could 
gain through job rotation was related to the level of their positions. Workers were 
normally put to work after elementary orientation at the factories and gained most 
training “on-the-job”. A senior member was assigned to train the newly recruited 
workers in basic skills. Job rotation was selectively applied in FLEXIBILITY Co. due 
to the high level of labour turnover. Workers, in general, did have the chance to work 
on different tasks. Nevertheless, most tasks were standardised and routinised, and 
therefore required limited skills. Employees who had been with the company for 10 
years would not be able to develop broad and specialised skills, unless they struggled 
to move up the job ladder. Managers justified keeping tasks routine because the high 
rates of labour made deepening work knowledge “impractical”, hence tasks were fool-
proofed in order that smooth production flows could be scheduled. Managers at the 
junior level did have a chance to work in different functions but it was very unlikely 
that these junior managers would be transferred across factories, each of was treated 
as a stand-alone manufacturing unit.  
Employee voice and enterprise unions  
An important similarity between COMMUNITY Co. and FLEXIBILITY Co. is the 
way employee voice was managed. Both companies encouraged group meetings to 
gather on-site suggestions from the employees. Both of the companies encouraged 
workers’ improvement suggestions, a practice commonly adopted in the Japanese 
companies. COMMUNITY Co. awarded the “Outstanding Suggestion Prize” each 
year. As the managers below explained, the local managers were very keen to 
cultivate employees’ voluntary participation by boosting their sense of belonging to 
the company. 
“We believe that our employees should think themselves as members of the large 
family—the company. At least, I think I am responsible for taking care of my 
employees and I feel many of my colleagues feel the same way.” (Divisional 
Manager, COMMUNITY Co., Chinese, male, 35) 
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“It takes time for our employees to get used to providing improvement suggestions. 
However, when they are used to these, they come up with suggestions spontaneously, 
even after they leave this company.” (Manager, administrative division, 
COMMUNITY Co., Chinese, female, 38) 
What has to be highlighted was that the managers are well aware of the difficulty of 
cultivating this sense of belonging. Many workers expressed the idea that they are 
“pressurised” to take part rather than “motivated” to do so.  
 “Our assessment is not just about quantity and quality but also the managers’ 
impression of our work attitude. We have to show a positive attitude, like giving 
suggestions to avoid production accidents or cleaning of the machines.” (Worker, 
COMMUNITY Co. Chinese, male, 20) 
This partly reflects Taylor’s (1999) observation that monetary reward is important to 
motivate the workers to participate in providing suggestions. In fact, in 
FLEXIBILITY Co., workers whose suggestion was accepted for implementation were 
rewarded. This direct line between employee suggestion and pay indicates more 
contractual employment relations operating in this company. The amount of reward 
was often decided by the managers according to the “significance” of improvement. 
This meant that work-related decisions were made in a “top-down” manner.  
“The accepted suggestions are announced on the white board and we are asked to 
collect our awards from the personnel office. But there is no way to know how our 
suggestions are assessed or how much the suggestions help to improve production.” 
(Operator, FLEXIBILITY Co. Chinese, male, 23) 
In terms of collective voice, both companies had enterprise unions. All workers were 
automatically members of the in-house union and none of them joined external 
workers’ associations. The in-house union functioned to organise social activities, 
such as end-of-year celebrations. In COMMUNITY Co., the union leader was the 
only female member in the management team and she was the only one who didn’t 
speak fluent Japanese. In FLEXIBILITY Co., the union leader was the administrative 
manager. He commented:  
“Our union representatives are paralysed. None of the employees here pay a 
membership fee to the union. The company allocate fees for union activities, such as 
building basketball courts.” (Administrative Manager/Union leader, FLEXIBILITY 
Co. Chinese, male, 34) 
Like unions in the SOEs, both companies in-house union were associated with the 
local branch of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), which functioned 
more as a government agent than an autonomous actor concerned with collective 
bargaining. The local union’s interest was to control possible active worker conflict by 
providing advisory services and conducting routine factory visits. In-house unions are 
therefore often responsible for implementing 5S, which is explained as a measure to 
enhance workplace health and safety protection.  
Tensions between employers and employees were observed. Tension often manifested 
itself in workers’ misbehaviour, and sometimes, sabotage. However, workers seldom 
took collective action, such as strikes. While lack of an independent collective 
representative body was one of reasons for non-organised forms of confrontation, the 
  16
 
 
 
availability of alternative employment opportunities was also important. Workers 
tended to chose to quit rather than fight against these dominant employers in the local 
area.  
Retention and exit 
Retention was managed differently as well. As explained earlier, COMMUNITY Co. 
endeavoured to develop long-term employment relations with employees. However, 
the companies had a strict policy of not paying to retain workers. The company 
viewed quitting as a way of screening-out those employees who were “not suited to 
the company”. The General Manager of COMMUNITY Co. explained the rationale of 
this policy:   
“Employee competence can be built internally, but people who stay with a job for 
money will also leave the company for money. This is why we won’t offer a raise to 
retain people. What I always say to our HR managers is that don’t worry about 
losing some people. We will train others who have the commitment to the 
company.”(General Manager, COMMUNITY Co., male, Japanese, 58)  
COMMUNITY Co.’s preference for an internally trained workforce was also reflected 
in their policy of not firing employees. The HR manager explained that an employee 
would be offered a transfer if he/she was found to be not competent for a job. 
However, such transfer often led to the employee choosing to quit the company since 
an “ungraceful” transfer would mean losing opportunities for future career 
advancement.  
Likewise, FLEXIBILITY Co. seldom fired an employee, which may largely be due to 
high turnover removing workers before dismissal occurred. Neither did the company 
implement a clear retention policy. The HR manager said that retention was dealt with 
case by case. In practice, the company did not take any measure to retain workers and 
junior managers. For managers at key positions, FLEXIBILITY Co. would normally 
conduct a face-to-face consultation to find out the reasons for leaving and offer 
alternative packages to retain the employees. In this sense, employees at senior 
managerial positions enjoyed better job security compared to the junior members in 
the company.   
CONCLUSION  
 
The paper has highlighted different patterns of employment relations adopted by two 
Japanese subsidiaries operating in a shared setting. Despite the fact that both 
companies were set up in the mid 1990s, were wholly owned by Japanese companies, 
carried out standardised and routinised production, and faced a similar local labour 
market, the companies exercised contrasting policies to manage a highly mobile 
workforce. The following table summarises the key similarities and differences of 
employment practices adopted by COMMUNITY Co. and FLEXIBILITY Co.  
[insert Table 1 here] 
Comparing the key differences between the two companies, we found that 
COMMUNITY Co. showed important characteristics of a “community firm” like their 
Japanese parent. The company was keen on building employee loyalty. They recruited 
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a relatively homogenous group of employees and provided intensive language and 
corporate culture training. A unified job-grade system was applied to all employees 
and managers. Technical and managerial training was highly internalised. Corporate 
knowledge was essential for performance assessment and career advancement. 
Managers were all internally promoted and worked on the shop floor before being 
promoted to their current positions. These showed that the company intended to 
develop organisation-focused employment relations (Tsui, et al., 1995). In contrast, 
FLEXIBILITY Co. had developed a dual-system to manage employment and labour 
relations in China. A limited number of senior managers were considered “core“ and 
therefore offered extensive pay and benefit packages, intensive on-the-job and off-the-
job training, world-wide promotion opportunities and job security. For the rest of the 
employees, employment relations were based on a short-term contract. Workers were 
mainly formed by migrants. The company had policies that encouraged employees to 
seek training from external professional bodies. No language or professional training 
was provided in-house. Internal career advancement was very difficult but not 
impossible. The loyalty based employment relations was absent and the company 
relied on the market to source and develop the workforce. This indicated the 
company’s move towards more job-focused employment relations (Tsui, et al., 1995). 
Such contrasting employment practices were important in reassessing several key 
debates concerning employment relations in China. 
First of all, the comparison between COMMUNITY Co. and FLEXIBILITY Co. 
offered a critique to the transfer literature, which suggests firms move their 
employment relations with them when they internationalise, especially where local 
institutional practice are weak and home practices mature and robust. While the parent 
companies’ influence can hardly be ignored in both our cases (such as adopting a 
sophisticated pay-for-the-job-grade system), similarities between the subsidiaries 
cannot solely be interpreted by the country-of-origin thesis. Industrial sector is as 
important, if not more important, in defining these similarities. Companies in the 
textile fibre industry compete on economies of scale, which means employers are 
more powerful in the labour market. Semi-automated production technology, the 
repetitive nature of tasks and low skill requirements of job design indicates and that 
entry training could be shortened and that sourcing/replacement of employees was 
easy, which reinforced the power of employers in China’s immature labour market 
with its massive surplus of unskilled labour. Besides industrial sector, the lack of 
employee representation bodies further weakened the employees’ power in 
employment negotiation. It is exactly the strength of employers in the local labour 
market that allowed the subsidiary autonomy to manage employment relations in 
distinctive ways.  
These findings therefore challenge the idea that internationalisation of employment 
relations as a consequence of the spread of transnational companies is squeezing the 
space for workplace level employment relations diversity (Edwards et al., 2007). In 
fact, our findings reconfirm that there is substantial autonomy at the workplace or 
subsidiary level to manage and control employee relations in radically different ways. 
We observed a developmental trend of subsidiary level construction of employment 
relations. Given the abundant labour supply when both subsidiaries were set up, they 
were able to choose different local sources of employees. COMMUNITY Co.’s choice 
of technical college students led to their reliance on internal resources to cultivate 
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skills and pursued commitment based employment relations, whereas FLEXIBILITY 
Co.’s choice of local job agents made it practical to use the external market to source 
skills and hence moved towards the contract based employment relations that have 
become embedded in China. We would agree on the point that subsidiary autonomy is 
often restrained both by local institutions as well as the internal power play among the 
Japanese and Chinese managers. Divergent ways of managing employment relations 
are often outcomes of such power play, rather than a straightforward reflection of 
globalisation or localisation pressures (Smith, 2008).  
Finally, our findings suggest that the argument that employment juridification will 
lead to standardisation of employment relations, especially in so-called sunrise 
regions (Lee, 2007) needs some qualification. Although promulgation of the 
Employment Contract Law imposed more legislative pressure on companies adopting 
more standard employment practices such as offering long-term contracts to 
employees, enhancing workplace safety and protection, and reinforcing employers’ 
responsibility for employee social welfare. This legislation will, however not restrain 
companies from developing either organisation-focused employment relations or job-
focused employment relations. As explained earlier, employment practices adopted by 
both companies complied with the legal frameworks under the Employment Contract 
Law. For COMMUNITY Co., offering firm specific benefits more than the minimum 
legal requirements is a key measure for employee loyalty building and internalisation 
of the labour market. FLEXIBILITY Co.’s use of contracted workers did not violate 
the state labour laws and local labour policies. Furthermore, as current employment 
relations didn’t encounter strong resistance from the employee groups or local trade 
unions, the contrast between COMMUNITY Co. and FLEXIBILITY Co. is more 
likely to be maintained, at least in the near future. We therefore argue that this 
diversity is likely to persist, and not trend towards standardisation under twin 
pressures from the state or capital globalisation.  
Our findings cannot be over generalised as the study is based on two companies from 
a country with relatively homogenous and distinctive employment relations (Japan) 
located in the same employment and work relations context of China, where external 
institutional patterns remain fluid and not mature. Within this shared setting we 
showed the continued autonomy of the subsidiary, thus highlighting the real need for 
more workplace based case studies to understand the social reality and diversity of 
employment relations in contemporary China. In order to test the external validity of 
our research findings, comparative case studies could be located in a mature and 
robust host country setting to investigate the extent of autonomy allowed for 
subsidiary control of employment relations.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 Employment Relations in COMMUNITY Co. and FLXIBILITY Co. 
    COMMUNITY Co.  FLEXIBILITY Co. 
Similarities  Both companies preferred young and unskilled workers. Workforce 
composition  Differences  70% of the workforce were local 
technical college students; 10% 
were university graduates and 20% 
migrants. Recruitment and 
selection were done by the 
company. All engineers, shop floor 
group leaders, supervisors and 
managers were internally 
promoted. 
70% were migrants and 15% locals, 
who were recruited through the 
local job centres. The remaining 
15% were university graduates, 
mostly recruited by the Chinese 
headquarters. Half of the 
engineers, supervisors and 
managers were internally 
promoted and the rest were 
recruited externally. 
Similarities  Job design in both companies was repetitive and organised around semi‐
automated production technology. Work pressure came from both speed 
of the machines and close supervision. Job‐rotation was restrained within 
individual department.  
Job Design 
Differences  Average working time was 8 
hours; overtime was voluntary. 
Average working time was 10 hours; 
overtime was often involuntary. 
Similarities  Pay was higher than most companies in the local area. Both companies 
adopted a pay‐for‐the‐job‐grade system.  
Pay and 
Benefits 
Differences  The company offered more in‐
house benefits, such as free health 
care, accommodation and food. 
Payment to employees’ social 
insurance account was more than 
legal requirement.  
Pay‐for‐the‐job‐grade system is 
linked to the parent company’s job 
grade system. The company 
followed the legal requirements in 
terms of contribution to 
employees’ social insurance 
accounts. Employees were 
expected to pay for the 
accommodation and other in‐
house services offered by the 
company. 
Similarities  Limited training was given to new starters.  Training and 
career 
advancement 
Differences  All employees were required to go 
through Japanese training. 
Technical and managerial training 
were offered in‐house. Japanese 
proficiency was essential for 
internal career advancement. 
The company offered financial 
support to employees seeking 
professional training. Senior 
managers were offered on‐the‐job 
managerial training.  
Similarities  Enterprise union had weak representation function. Union leaders took 
part in management meetings but their voice was often marginalized. 
Limited collective action was observed. 
Employee 
representation 
Differences  Enterprise union was actively 
involved in encouraging 
employees to provide 
improvement suggestions 
Enterprise union has limited 
internal function. 
Similarities  Both companies seldom fire their employees. Retention 
Differences  No retention package was offered.  Managers and engineers were 
offered individual consultation and 
retention packages were decided 
on a case by case basis. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix1 Demographical Information of the informants 
  Employee 
groups 
Number of 
participants 
Nationality  Age  Gender 
COMMUNITY 
CO. 
Expatriates  10 (1 at 
Shanghai office, 
1 at Beijing 
office) 
Japanese  2 expats in 
their 30s, the 
rest 1 in their 
40s and 7 in 
their 50s 
male 
  Local staff  24  Chinese  24 to 38  5 female  
19 male 
  Workers  246 (22 were 
formally 
interviewed) 
Chinese  20 to 42  62 female 
184 male 
FLEXIBILITY 
Co. 
Expatriates  8 (2 at 
FLEXIBILITY Co. 
Chinese 
headquarters) 
Japanese  7 in their 40s 
and 1 in his 50s  
male 
  Local staff  29  Chinese  23 to 45  8 female  
21 male 
  Workers  213 (23 were 
formally 
interviewed) 
Chinese  16 to 39  47 female 
166 male 
 
                                                            
i Blecher (2010: 106) notes: ‘Within months, most Wal‐Mart union branches came to 
be dominated by management, its objective ally in the local Party branches, or both. Some 
dispirited worker activists cried out in their blogs to ‘save the Wal‐Mart union!’. Others accused 
their democratically elected union branch leaders of corruption, authoritarianism and sloth. As 
early as March 2008, Han Dongfang, a leading advocate for workers’ rights, was driven to 
abandon his earlier hopes, arguing that the Wal‐Mart unions were mere window dressing.’ 
ii High students who fall below university entry requirements can choose to join technical colleges. 
These colleges normally offer 3‐year practical training. Students are awarded graduate certificates 
after successfully completing 3‐year education.  
iii Japanese Language Proficiency Test is the official language test arranged by the Ministry of 
Education of Japan. The test has four levels. Level 4 is an elementary level and Level 1 is the most 
advanced level. 
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